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RAILROAD REHABILITATION AND -EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAWS
IT has heretofore been apparent that the Interstate Commerce
Commission, in dealing with the problems of railroad regulation
and rehabilitation, has been influenced largely by considerations
of expediency rather than any principles of vested rights in
individual carriers. The reason is obvious, for while the rail-
roads like other utilities are guaranteed a fair return and limited
thereto, the intricate network of competing carriers has pre-
cluded any adjustment of a fair return on the basis of individual
rate regulation. Higher rates granted to one railroad would serve
only to divert traffic to its competitor; attempts to adjust rates
to the needs of the stronger carriers would drive the weaker
roads with relatively high operating costs out of business; and
any adjustment on the basis of the needs of the weaker roads
would give the stronger carriers an unearned excess over their
fair return. Realizing the necessity of uniform rates between
competing carriers, the Commission has sought to solve the
problem of a fair return by shifting the burden of aiding the
weaker carriers from the consumer-shipper to the stronger rail-
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roads themselves. Such a policy, involving as it does the constant
taking of the "property" of the stronger carriers for the benefit
of the weak, at once appears to do violence to the accepted tradi-
tion of rugged individualism so inherent in our Anglo-American
law. Fortified, however, by the mandates of the Transportation
Act,' which looked to the establishment of an adequate and uni-
fied national transportation system, the Commission has been
little concerned with fulminations against discrimination, consti-
tutional or otherwise.
One of the earliest and most effective discriminatory devices
for aiding the weaker carriers has been the readjustment of divi-
sions of joint rates. Prior to 1920, the Commission supposedly
had the authority to determine divisions by a consideration of
"all the circumstances and equities" involved, 2 but not until that
time was it specifically empowered to consider the financial needs
of the carriers. 3 When, shortly after the resumption of private
control, the credit of the New England lines was seriously im-
paired, the Commission ordered a general rate increase, and
granted larger divisions to the New England group.4 Similarly,
increased divisions were accorded the western railroads as a
group on a finding that their financial condition was not so sound
as that of the southern carriers.5 The most striking illustration
of the extent to which this device has been carried, was the
granting by the Commission of increased divisions to a carrier
threatened with insolvency, yet found to be a public necesity,
even in the face of evidence that the connecting carriers were not
at the time earning a fair return., Despite the obvious effect of
the device to favor certain carriers, the Supreme Court in the
New England Divisions Case 7 unhesitatingly approved it, Mr.
141 STAT. 474 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1926).
2 The Commission has never committed itself to a mileage, or any other
fixed basis, in readjusting divisions of joint rates. See Star Grain & Lum-
ber Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 14 I. C. C. 364, 370 (1908).
3 Kansas City, Mexico & Orient Divisions, 73 I. C. C. 319 (1922); Nevada-
California-Oregon Divisions, 73 I. C. C. 330 (1922).
4 New England Divisions, 66 I. C. C. 196 (1922). Thus by increasing the
divisions, the uniformity of the rate structure was left undisturbed.
5 Divisions of Freight Rates, 148 I. C. C. 457 (1928), order sustained in
Beaumont, Sour Lake & W. Ry. v. United States, 282 U. S. 74, 51 Sup, Ct. 1
(1930). The Commission's practice of granting increased divisions on a
group basis, instead of to each individual carrier, was also approved.
6 Divisions of Joint Rates and Fares of M. & N. A. R. R., 68 I. C. C, 47
(1922).
7261 U. S. 184, 43 Sup. Ct. 270 (1923). In Brimstone R. R. & Canal
Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 104, 48 Sup. Ct. 282 (1928), the Commis-
sion's order granting increased divisions was held invalid, on the ground
that it had been made solely on evidence that the connectink carriers were




Justice Brandeis pointing out the impossibility of departing from
the uniform rate structure and still maintaining effective trans-
portation facilities.
A further means by which the Commission was permitted to
utilize earnings of the stronger railroads for the benefit of the
weak, was afforded by the provisions of the Transportation Act
authorizing the recapture of one-half the carrier's earnings in
excess of six per cent, the fund acquired to be employed in main-
taining railroad credit.8 This course also was approved by the
Supreme Court as an efficient method of mitigating the effect of
uniform rate schedules.9 As a practical aid in solving the problem
faced by the Commission, recapture has proved utterly unwork-
able, and the Commission now seeks the repeal by Congress."0
Yet another scheme to achieve the same result and equally dis-
criminatory in the sense that it works to the benefit of certain
roads, is the Commission's recent proposal to grant a general in-
crease in freight rates and appropriate the added revenue to a
credit pool for the benefit of the carriers unable to meet their
fixed interest charges." Unfortunately, the Commission has been
persuaded to modify this plan because of suggested "legal ob-
stacles." 2 Any such measure as this is, of course, a tentative
device of rehabilitation, pending the contemplated consolidation
of the carriers into a limited number of systems.13 And in this
eventuality the leveling-out process would again take effect and
the cry of discrimination may very likely be raised. For were the
railroads allowed in combining to follow the dictates of individual
expediency, the strong carriers would desire notling more than
to avail themselves of the opportunity of strengthening their own
positions. Yet the plan calls for the consolidation of the strong
8 41 STAT. 488 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 152 (1926).
9Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. CL
169 (1924).
:o U. S. Daily, Dec. 11, 1931, at 2307.
2 "Fifteen Percent Case, 178 I. C. C. 539 (1931); Comment (1932) 41
YALE L. J. 425.
2 See U. S. Daily, Dec. 8, 1931, at 2275, Dec. 12, at 2322, Dec. 14, at 2332,
Dec. 15, at 2342. The legal objection put forward by the carriers to the
credit pool was that by assenting to the pooling of railroad earnings, the
directors would render themselves liable to suits by the stockholders. The
plan now attempted by the carriers involves the granting of loans to finan-
cially unstable railroads through the medium of a railroad credit corpora-
tion. It is difficult to see why the directors might not be equally liable to
action by stockholders because of loans granted to admittedly poor risks.
Nor can it be convincingly argued that the weak railroads will be bene-
fited by increasing their fixed interest charges when they are unable to
meet those accruing at the present time. The credit scheme is apparently
based not on a recognition of the existing dilemma, but on the unreliable
assumption that prosperity is "around the corner."
13 See Consolidation of Railroads, 63 I. C. C. 455 (1921), 159 1. C. C. 522
(1929), 163 I. C. C. 188 (1930).
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carriers with the weak, resulting in financial and managerial
benefits only to the latter.
The plea of discrimination, heretofore thus ineffectual to im-
pede the Commission's program of rehabilitation, has more re-
cently met with striking success in a case where its application
seemed least appropriate. In 1926, the Commission entered into
an extensive investigation of car-hire costs. 4 Compensation for a
carrier's cars in use on foreign lines has been a matter of agree-
ment.:' Car-hire was formerly computed on a mileage basis, but
this method offered no incentive for the speedy return of cars
in use. As a result, the American Railway Association in 1902
required its members to subscribe to a per diem agreement, 0 and
forbade their dealing with non-members on any other basis. The
short-line railroads, which were not permitted to become mem-
bers of the Association," complained of the undue burdens im-
posed on them by the per diem rules. These carriers owned little
equipment of their own. They were occupied for the most part
in time-consuming terminal and originating services with which
the long-haul carriers were not burdened. Then too, although
the short-line carriers were paid per diem with no reclaims or
allowances, they were obliged, under the national demurrage rules,
to allow free time to shippers before assessing demurrage. Thus
equality of car-hire costs actually did not exist and many of the
short-line carriers testified before the Commission that the impo-
sition of the per diem basis of settlement would drive them into
insolvency.18 The Commission did not favor a per diem system
2
4 Rules for Car-hire Settlement, 160 I. C. C. 369 (1930); Supplemental
Report, 165 I. C. C. 495 (1930).
Is Where goods were shipped on a through route over the lines of several
carriers the method first employed was to stop the carriage and reload the
goods on the cars of the railroad continuing the haul. This scheme con-
siderably delayed the movement of commodities, and as a result the car-
riers were soon required to allow their cars to proceed beyond the limitts
of their own lines. Missouri & Illinois Coal Co. v. Illinois Central R. It, 22
I. C. C. 39 (1911). While the cars remained on other lines, the owning
carrier received compensation for car-hire.
26 Rules for Car-hire Settlement, 160 I. C. C. 369, 376 (1930).
17 The so-called short-line railroads, with less than $100,000 annual operat-
ing revenue, were permitted to become "associate members" of the American
Railway Association, but had no voting rights, and hence no voice in the
determination of policy or protection of their own interests. The American
Railway Association comprises 78% of the railroads which own 99% of the
7quipment ind operate over 90% of the milage. The interests of the short-
line carriers are represented by the American Short Line Railroad Association.
18 Under the per diem rules where a carrier performed switching service,
requiring a great deal of time, car-hire was paid to the car owner but an
arbitrary amount per car could be reclaimed from the immediate connecting
carrier. This arrangement was known as a switching reclaim. Non-sub-
scribers to the per diem agreement, however, were not allowed switching
reclaims and consequently the short-line carriers were forced to accept
per diem or perform switching service without the benefit of reclaims.
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with reclaims, because such a plan had proven in the past a
fertile source of rebates for shippers.20 Nor did it desire to de-
prive the trunk lines of the advantages of per dicm compensation
by the establishment of some sort of a modified demurrage
scheme.2' Consequently it found the per diem basis reasonable,
but allowed the short-line carriers two days' free time, in order
to equalize the costs and to compensate them for the time-con-
suming character of their services and the free time accorded
shippers.2
1
The policy of the Commission is thus apparent. Seeking con-
stantly to preserve the uniform rate structure, it has approached
the problem of maintaining an adequate transportation system
indirectly through the medium of consolidation, which affects
the organization of the system; through recapture and divisions
of joint rates, which affect earnings; and now through car-hire,
which affects operating costs. In each device there inheres,
to some extent, a deprivation of benefits which would otherwise
have accrued to the stronger carriers. Heretofore its program
has been generally approved by the Supreme Court. But in Chi-
cago, R. L & P. Ry. Co. v. United States 2 the Supreme Court,
through Mr. Justice Sutherland, held the Commission's order
with respect to car-hire invalid, on the ground that it violated
the Fifth Amendment by confiscating the property of the car-
riers not included in the two days' exemption from per diem.
In an able dissent, Mr. Justice Stone argued that the question
was not whether the carriers should be paid for their cars, but
who should pay, and that the Commission had before it ample
evidence that the shortline railroads were contributing a dispro-
portionate share of car-hire costs. He observed that "the per
diem system adopted by the American Railway Association in
1902 is not embedded in the Fifth Amendment adopted by this.
nation in 1791."
:1- See Industrial Railways Case, 29 I. C. C. 212 (1914). Where industries
owned their own short-line railways, rebates were accorded them by the
trunk lines through the medium of excessive reclaims and divisions paid
to the industry's carrier. In 1912 the Pennsylvania railroad alone paid
over $1,000,000 in divisions to only ten such industrial railways connected
with steel plants.
20 See Northampton & Bath R. R. Case, 41 I. C. C. 63 (1916) ; Birmingham
Southern R. R. v. Director General, 61 I. C. C. 551 (1921). Such a plan
would allow the trunk lines to collect demurrage from the short-line car-
riers with free time allowed the latter as a compensation for the free time
accorded shippers before the accrual of demurrage.
-21165 I. C. C. 495 (1930).
22284 U. S. 80, 52 Sup. Ct. 87 (1931). The Court sustained that part of
the Commission's order requiring the payment of switching reclaims to non-
subscribers as well as to subscribers of the per dicm rules, and relieving the
short-line carriers of the burden of reporting per diem accruals to the nu-
merous car owners.
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It is significant that the objections of the majority are not
based on the unreasonableness of the per diem charge, set by the
Commission, but on the exceptions made to the rule. The court
expressly concedes that were the two days' free time extended
to all the carriers, the order would be valid. In other words, the
Court is concerned not with the confiscation of property, but with
discrimination, for it is difficult to see why "taking" the property
of all the carriers is less obnoxious than depriving a few, unless
the objection of discrimination is relied upon.
It is important to observe, however, that the principle of equal
protection of the laws, while applicable to state legislation, does
not appear in the Fifth Amendment as a limitation upon federal
power. It is true that the Supreme Court, when confronted in
the past with the argument that a federal statute is discrimina-
tory, has frequently held it valid on the ground that it sets up a
reasonable classification of persons or things affected. 3 Thus by
justifying the reasonableness of the classification, instead of
pointing out the irrelevance of the charge of discrimination as
applied to federal legislation, the Court has seemed to indicate
that equal protection of the laws may be impliedly included in
the Fifth Amendment as a limitation on federal power. There
are, however, strong dicta to the contrary.24 The clearest and
most direct statement regarding the relation between due process
in the Fifth Amendment and equal protection was made by Mr.
Justice Taft in Trwx v. Corrigan: "The due process clause,
brought down from Magna Charta, was found in the early state
constitutions, and later in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution as a limitation upon the executive and judicial pow-
ers of the Federal Government, while the equality clause does not
appear in the Fifth Amendment, and so does not apply to con-
gressional legislation." 25
23 District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, 29 Sup. Ct. 560 (1909);
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169 (1912);
Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298 (1917). In matters of taxa-
tion, the power of Congress to classify has been almost unlimited. See
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236 (1916).
24 In United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 417, 29 Sup.
Ct. 527, 539 (1909), Mr. Justice White, in discussing the timber exception
in the commpdities clause, said: "Deciding, as we do, that the clause, as
construed, was a lawful exercise by Congress of the power to regulate
commerce, we know of no constitutional limitation requiring that such a
regulation when adopted should be applied to all commodities alike. It
follows that even if we gave heed to the many reasons of expedience which
have been suggested in argument against the exception, and the injustice
and favoritism which it is asserted will be operated thereby, that fact can
have no weight in passing upon the question of power. And the same
reasons also dispose of the contention that the clause is void as a discrimina-
tion between carriers." See also Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371, 384, 21
Sup. Ct. 616, 621 (1901).
21 257 U. S. 312, 332, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 129 (1921).
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There is nothing in the car-hire case to indicate that the Su-
preme Court was consciously applying the principle of equal pro-
tection of the laws; the precise question is presented neither by
the majority opinion nor by the dissent. But the practical effect
of the decision is to indicate the possibilities of equal protection
as a constitutional limitation upon federal railroad legislation.
The Court has once more picked up the banner of individualism,
and instead of regarding the railroads as a unified system, it has
treated them as so many competing corner groceries. The order
in the car-hire case is in fact most innocuous from the point of
view of discrimination. Actually the Commission sought to eradi-
cate the discrimination which existed against the short-line car-
riers. It can readily be seen that such treatment, disguised in the
car-hire case under the principle of equal protection of the laws,
is inconsistent with the Commission's program of rehabilitation.
It is submitted that if the Court seeks to extend these principles
further, effective solution of the railroad problem will be indefi-
nitely delayed. In view of the present precarious position of the
weaker carriers, the denial of substantial relief from the burden
of car-hi-re costs may in itself seriously cripple a vital part of
the transportation system.
APPELLATE PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RADIO
ACT
THE complicated series of facts culminating in the recent case of
General Broadcasting Systenm v. Bridgeport Broadcasting Sta-
tion,1 began April 21, 1930, when the Radio Commission refused
the application of Station WGBS, of the General Broadcasting
System, for a renewal of its license to operate on a frequency of
600 kilocycles, and instead granted to Station WICO, of the
Bridgeport System, the right to operate on that frequency. On
April 25th the Commission handed the license to the Department
of Commerce for delivery to MCC. On April 26th, while it was
still in the possession of the Department, WGBS filed its appeal
from the decision to the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia 2 and obtained a stay order which was served on the
Commission. However, since that body took the-position that the
matter had passed beyond its control, the license was delivered
to WICC, which immediately began operation on the new fre-
quency. Interference with WGBS resulted, and the latter station
153 F. (2d) 664 (D. Conn. 1931).
244 STAT. 1169 (1927), as amended in 46 STAT. 844 (1930), 47 U. S. C.
(Cum. Supp. 1931) § 96, provides that appeals from decisions of the Fed-




obtained an enlarged stay order requiring the Commission, pend-
ing the appeal, to recall and set aside forthwith any license
granted WICC to broadcast on 600 kilocycles. The Commission
complied with the order, but WICC continued to operate on the
new frequency, whereupon WGBS sought an injunction in the
United States. District Court of Connecticut.3 A temporary re-
straining order was granted pending the disposition of the appeal
in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, and WGBS
gave the customary bond. On February 2, 1931, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Federal Radio Commission.'
WGBS then moved to dismiss its suit in the District Court, and
in a supporting affidavit asked that the injunction bond be dis-
charged. The court, however, refused the discharge, on the the-
ory that the stay order of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia was ineffective by reason of the fact that the power to
issue stays, though unquestionably an incident of the judicial
function of that court, was not a prerogative inherent in an ad-
ministrative tribunal,5 nor a power expressly or impliedly con-
ferred on the court by the Radio Act of 1927. Consequently, what-
ever damage WICC suffered arose from the injunction, and since
the matter had been resolved in its favor,, it was allowed to
move for an assessment of damages against the bond. Upon a
recent rehearing the court altered its stand to the extent of ad-
mitting the plaintiff's proposition that Congress, in entrusting
to the Court of Appeals specific administrative duties, intended
that it might draw upon its existing powers as a judicial body
in the exercise of those duties.7 It concluded, nevertheless, that
3 WICC filed an "appeal" from the doings of the Radio Commission in
the United States District Court of Connecticut, on the theory that the
Commission's action constituted a revocation of its license. WGBS Inter-
vened, and its motion to dismiss the appeal was granted.
4General Broadcasting System v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 F, (2d)
426 (App. D. C. 1931).
GThe court here follows Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric
Company, 281 U. S. 464, 50 Sup. Ct. 389 (1930), in which the Supremn
Court of the United States held that in radio cases the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia, vested with legislative as well as constitu-
tional powers, acted as a superior and revising administrative tribunal.
Consequently, the Supreme Court, a purely constitutional body, lacked jur-
isdiction to review its decisions in these cases which present no judicial
controversy in the onstitutional sense.
oBut as to the rights of the obligee on an injunction bond, where the
question has become moot, of. Columbus, H. V. & T. Ry. v. Burke, 54 Ohio
St. 98, 43 N. E. 282 (1896). As to the discretion of the court in these cases,
see Russell v. Farley, 105 U. S. 433 (1881).
'r Upon the general power of the Court of Appeals to issue stays in pur-
suance of its administrative function, the court's earlier conclusion seenis
erroneous, since the very act creating the court and giving it power to
issue all necessary and proper remedial and prerogative writs in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction (D. C. Ann. Code (1929) Title 18, § 33, 27 STAT.
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since in 1927 an appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia did not operate as a supersedeas except upon bond,
failure to require bond in the instant case rendered the stay in-
effective.8 Consequently, the decision against WGBS was affirmed.
In support of its ultimate holding the court cites Local Govcivz-
ment Board v. Arlidge,9 an English case asserting the proposition
that a legislature, in entrusting to an existing administrative
body specific appellate duties, is deemed to have adopted the
procedure theretofore established by that body. The statutes and
court rules applicable to the procedure of the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia, as of 1927, specifically required a
bond where an appeal from the Municipal Court,", the Juvenile
Court,1 the Police Court,- and the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia, 3 operated as a supersedeas. But since both statutes
and court rules are, by their terms, made applicable to "plaintiffs
in error" or "appellants," and since the general purpose of super-
sedeas bonds is to ensure such a party compensation for any dam-
age suffered by reason of his hand being stayed pending the final
determination of the appeal,1 4 the applicability of the bond re-
quirement to appeals under the Radio Act seems extremely doubt-
ful. The successful radio station is not strictly a party to the
appeal. Before the amendment to Section 16 of the Radio Act of
1927, it was merely allowed to intervene in the appeal by grace
of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Since the
amendment, it merely intervenes as of right, and the real party
436 (1893)] gave the court power to review decisions of the Patent Office
[27 STAT. 436 (1893), 35 U. S. C. § 59 (1928)]. This review was held an
administrative one in Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S.
693, 47 Sup. Ct. 284 (1927).
s In causes like the instant one arising prior to July 1, 1930, the powers
of the Court of Appeals in radio appeals could only be attacked collater-
ally, following the decision in the General Electric case, &:pra note 5. But
by amendment effective on that date, Congress altered the character of the
appeal from the Radio Commission to the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia to give it a judicial nature in order that the Supreme Court
might review the decision. On the effectiveness of the amendment see
Guider, A Discussion of the Anzendnzzt to Section 16 of The Radio Act
of 1927 (1930) 1 JOURNAL OF Am LAW 613, 615.
9 [1915] A. C. 120.
10 D. C. ANN. CODE (1929) Title 18, § 29.
11Ibid., § 30.
SIbid., § 28.
'315 STAT. 226 (1868), 28 U. S. C. § 869 (1928), is by its terms broad
enough to include appeals from this court, as is Rule 10 of the REVISED
RuLns (effective Dec. 1, 1927) of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia. It must be noted that Rule 22, providing that the general rules
of the court shall apply to appeals under the Radio Act, cannot be con-
trolling under the Arlidge case, as it was not in effect when the Radio Act
was passed.
14 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1931) § 5532.
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to the appeal remains the Federal Radio Commission, which obvi-
ously suffers no damage beyond that covered by a cost bond pend-
ing the appeal. It would be a novel extension of the meaning of
these statutes to hold that they require supersedeas bonds in
favor of intervenors. Rather would it appear that the provisions
for appeal bonds are applicable only to cases or controversies re-
viewed by the court in its judicial capacity, and arising in tri-
bunals of the sort specifically referred to in the statutes. Con-
gress cannot be presumed under the doctrine of the Ar'lldg case
to have intended the adoption of an inapplicable judicial pro-
cedure for an administrative purpose.
The only analogous situation from which the procedure of the
Court of Appeals in its administrative function in 1927 can be
inferred involves appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of
Patents.8 The pertinent statute, prior to its amendment in 1931,11
provided that before a decision should be rendered on an applica-
tion for a patent, all those whom the Commissioner might deem
interested parties should be notified. If the finding was in favor
of the priority of the invention, the patent was to issue unless an
adverse party appealed within twenty days to the Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia. There could, therefore, be no
successful party pending final determination of the cause, since
until that time no patent issued. It must, therefore, be concluded
that in 1927 supersedeas bonds were not required on an adminis-
trative appeal to the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the prin-
ciple of the Arlidge case would lead to the opposite result from
that reached by the instant court.
Other principles of statutory construction than that embodied
in the Arlidge decision might be invoked to determine the issue in
the instant case. In some sixteen cases "I since the passage of the
Radio Act, stay orders without supersedeas bond have been
granted by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, and
the absence of bond has never been attacked.18 It is an estab-
lished rule that a long continued administrative interpretation
of a statute by those charged with its enforcement, while not con-
trolling on the courts, is entitled to special consideration.'
1" See note 7, supra.
16 The original statute is found in 16 STAT. 204 (1870), 35 U. S. C. § 52
(1928). By 45 STAT. 1476 (1929), 35 U. S. C. (Cum. Supp. 1931) § 59a,
the review of patent cases is transferred to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals.
17 See Caldwell, Appeals From Radio Decisions (1930) 1 ounNAL o0 Ant
LAw 274, 306 ff., for a discussion of these cases.
Is The Commission could, before July 1, 1930, have disregarded tho orders
on the theory that they. were void, and thus questioned their validity in a
collateral action.
9 It is said that the interpretation must be long continued and consis,
tent. The Laura, 114 U. S. 411, 5 Sup. Ct. 881 (1885). In Stuart v. Laird,
1 Cranch. 299 (U. S. 1803), "several years" were held enough. Probably
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Moreover, the acquiescence of the parties including the Radio
Commission, to such an interpretation is further evidence of its
correctness,20 as is also the fact that, while Section 16 providing
for appeal has been amended in several significant respects, Con-
gress did not alter the procedure followed on appeal by the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia." Indeed, the probable
intent of Congress can be gathered from the legislative history
of the Radio Act of 1927.22 In its final form, it was a compromise
effected to conciliate increasing antagonism to the creation of
another powerful administrative commission.2 In order par-
tially to allay this feeling, such broad powers of review -4were
given the Court of Appeals as to render it doubtful that Con-
gress intended a successful party before the Radio Commission
to acquire, pending appeal, the rights and status of a successful
party to a trial, calling for protection against loss by a super-
sedeas bond.
On the other hand, even if it be assumed that the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia mist require a supersedeas
to grant a stay order in radio cases, it does not follow that fail-
ure to do so renders the stay order ineffective. At common law
a writ of error - without any security operated as a supersedeas
from the time of its allowance by the court to which it was
directed.2r Because of dilatory tactics in using the writ, statutes
were passed requiring security in certain cases to make the writ
operate as a supersedeas. Thus, when the Judiciary Act of 1789
was passed, a provision, substantially incorporated in the present
Judicial Code,27 was included, requiring security that the appel-
lant shall prosecute his appeal to effect.2s The security must be
sufficient to answer all damages where the writ is a supersedeas
and stays execution. It is well settled, however, that the pres-
the life of the Radio Act of 1927 has been too short for any conclusive
presumption to be raised by an interpretation under it.
2 Pennell v. Philadelphia and Reading Ry., 231 U. S. 675, 34 Sup. CL
220 (1914); U. S. v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry., 43 F.
(2d) 300 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
21 Corning Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F. (2d) 798 (App. D. C. 1929).
But cf. Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227 (U. S. 1S73).
22 The legislative history of an act is pertinent in questions of its appli-
cation. Karnuth v. United States, 279 U. S. 231, 49 Sup. Ct. 274 (1929);
Banker's Trust Co. v. Bowers, 295 Fed. 89 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
23 68 CONG. REC. 4081 (1927).
24 See discussion as to the great extent of this review in Federal Trade
Commission v. General Electric Co., supra note 5.
'25 45 STAT. 54 (1928), 28 U. S. C. (Cum. Supp. 1931) § 861 (a) and (b)
provides for an appeal in all cases where review was formerly had on
writ of error.
26 Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co., 107 U. S. 378, 2 Sup. Ct. 911 (18S2);
HUGHES, op. cit. supra note 14, § 5531.
2715 STAT. 226 (1868), 28 U. S. C. § 869 (1926).
2 s HUGHES, op. cit. supra note 14, § 5531.
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ence or absence of the security is not a jurisdictional matter,2' and
that its omission affects only the regularity of the proceedings, and
may be rectified by permission of the appellate tribunal." And it
must be noted that in cases where the bond was later supplied, it
was upon demand of the appellee, to whom a supersedeas bond is a
matter of right.31 In the instant case, as has been indicated,
WICC had no such right. But even conceding that it could have
claimed the right, its failure to exercise it must be deemed a
waiver.
Conceding then that the omission of the supersedeas bond did
not deprive the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction, it follows that
the stay order was effective. Consequently, until the final de-
termination of the controversy by that tribunal, broadcasting
by WICC on the disputed frequency was in fact unlicensed.
When, therefore, a competitor petitioned to enjoin such, illegal
operation, it cannot be said that the injunction was improvidently
granted, regardless of the ultimate adjudication by the Court of
Appeals. Whatever damAge was suffered by WICC resulted from
the stay order and not from the injunction.
The difficulty in the instant case lies in the fact that the Radio
Commission actually delivered the license within five days after
making its decision and of course long before appeal could be
heard. The Radio Act of 1927, enacted in haste as a result of
the chaotic condition of the Radio Industry,32 is defective in its
total lack of some provision for procedure on appeal similar to
that found in analogous statutes. The Transportation Act of
1920, for example, provides that orders of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission shall take effect within a reasonable time un-
less suspended, modified or set aside by the courts." Similarly,
where arbitration awards are made in railway labor disputes,
they are effective ten days after they are filed in the office of a
clerk of a United States District Court, unless within such time
exceptions are filed, in which case the award goes into effect
only when the exceptions are finally disposed of on appeal." The
analogous provision in patent and trade mark cases has already
been discussed. To avoid such complications as ensued in the
29 Brown v. McConnell, 124 U. S. 489, 8 Sup. Ct. 559 (1888).
30 Ibid; Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U. S. 650, 10 Sup. Ct. 638 (1889).
3' McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 150 Fed. 102 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906).
32 See 68 CONG. Rnc. 4079 ff. (1927).
3341 STAT. 485 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 15 (2) (1928). See 1 SIIAIFMAX,
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMI SION (1931) 47, for an account of the
history of the provision.
3438 STAT. 107 (1913), 45 U. S. C: § 117 (1928). No specific provision
is made for appellate procedure in appeals from land office decisions. It
is significant, however, to note that in Anderson v. Woodward, 57 Colo. 50,
140 Pac. 198 (1914), it was held that, pending an appeal from an order
of the local land office rejecting a desert entry to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, the local decision was suspended.
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instant case from the hasty action of the Radio Commission,
Section 16 of the Radio Act of 1927 should be amended in like
fashion to provide that the filing of appeals within a given time
automatically suspends the effect of the Commission's decision
until final determination of the cause is had.
RECOVERY OF FOREIGN ASSETS OF INSOLVENTS
II. Collection and Transfer of Assets by A izcliary Receivers
WHEN a receiver is denied extra-territorial authority in dealing
with the assets of an insolvent and an ancillary receivership is
resorted to, resistance on the part of local creditors to the petition
of the ancillary receiver for leave to remit the assets to the court
of primary jurisdiction is often encountered. If the proceeding is
one under the National Bankruptcy Act, it is clear that general
unsecured creditors cannot successfully dispute the remittance,
since by the express terms of the Act they are referred to the court
of primary jurisdiction for the filing and allowance of their
claims.' The court appointing an ancillary receiver in bankruptcy
proceedings assumes only the custody and administration of so
much of the bankrupt's property as is located within its jurisdic-
tion and the only claims which it may adjudge are those affecting
the title to that property and equitable liens thereon. 2 When such
liens are satisfied from the proceeds of the sale of the property
and when other incidents of local administration are concluded,
the balance must be remitted to the court in which the bankruptcy
proceedings are being conducted.'
In an equity receivership, however, there is no statute or rule
of law giving to the administrator in the primary jurisdiction any
such paramount authority over the unencumbered assets, nor are
the rules governing proof of claims and collection of assets defi-
nitely fixed. The ancillary court must in each case do equity to
* The first of these comments, Recovery of Foreign Assets of Insolvent.-
Direct Proceedings in Foreign Courts, appeared in the February issue,
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 593.
'National Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 545 (1898), as amended, § 57c; 11
U. S. C. § 93c (1926).
2-Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gaskell, 195 Fed. 865 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912).
3 Ibi; Loeser v. Dallas, 192 Fed. 909 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911); Emerson v.
Castor, 236 Fed. 29 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916) ; In re Rodgers & Garrett Timber
Co., 22 F. (2d) 571 (D. Mld. 1927); In re Caplan, 23 F. (2d) 680 (D. Md.
1927). See REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (3d ed. 1923) § 2213; Friedman,
Receiverships in Bankruptcy (1905) 18 HARV. L. REv. 519. Although it
has been said that the ancillary court is under special obligation to deter-
mine the claims of adverse resident claimants (see Emerson v. Castor,
supra, at 37) it is difficult to see that there is room for differences of
treatment between residents and non-residents.
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the claimants before it, unsecured as well as secured, foreign as
well as local. At the same time it must have regard for the con-
siderations of comity which affect its relation to the primary re-
ceivership." It is, therefore, pertinent to inquire to what extent the
administration, developed case by case in equity receiverships,
tends to approximate, in the treatment of the foreign assets, the
system established by statute for bankruptcy proceedings.
It is frequently stated that the court has "discretion" as to the
transfer of assets to the principal jurisdiction.5 Like "comity,"
discretion is a term suggestive of the widest latitude of interpreta-
tion in all situations. Thus it is occasionally to be found support-
ing an attitude of pronounced localism in a demand that assets in
the ancillary jurisdiction be devoted to satisfying the claims of
local creditors in full,' without regard to the effect on claims pre-
sented elsewhere. The assumption underlying the dissenting opine
ion in Blake v. McClung,7 that the practical effect of denying to
citizens such a priority of claim upon assets located in the jurisdic-
tion is actually to discriminate against them, still lingers. But in
equity receiverships,8 as in bankruptcy proceedings," the equitable
treatment of all creditors is accepted as a governing principle and
the courts in dealing with the business problems of large receiver-
ships have sought with particularity the elements of an adminis-
tration advantageous as well as fair to all concerned.," The result
4 As to the character of the ancillary proceeding as one in aid of, and sub-
ordinate to, the primary receivership, see Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Northern Pacific R. R., 72 Fed. 26, 31 (Circuit Courts, E. D. Wis., W. D.
Wis., N. D. Ill., S. D. N. Y., D. Minn., D. N. D., D. Mont., . Idaho, D.
Wash., D. Ore. 1896); Matter of People (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.), 242 N. Y.
148, 164, 151 N. E. 159, 164 (1926); Clark v. Painted Post, 89 N. J. Eq.
409, 412, 107 Atl. 728, 730 (1918); Wickersham, Primary and Ancillary
Receiverships (1928) 14"VA. L. REv. 599.
5 Sands v. Greeley & Co., 88 Fed. 130 (C. C. A. 2d, 1898); Barley v. Git-
tings, 15 App. D. C. 427 (1899); Superior Cabinet Co. v. American Piano
Co., 39 F. (2d) 87 (D. Mass. 1930); see Receivers of Middlesex Banking
Co. v. Realty Investment Co., 104 Conn. 206, 218, 132 Atl. 390, 394 (1926).
Cf. Southern Building Co. v. Miller, 118 Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 4th, 1902); Note
(1926) 45 A. L. R. 632.
0 Frowert v. Blank, 205 Pa. St. 299, 54 Atl. 1000 (1903); of. Shloss v.
Surety Co., 149 Iowa 382, 128 N. W. 384 (1910).
7 172 U. S. 239, 19 Sup. Ct. 165 (1898), dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Brewer at 262, 19 Sup. Ct. at 174.
8 Sands v. Greeley & Co., supra note 5; Lewis v. American Naval Stores,
119 Fed. 391 (C. C. E. D. La. 1902); Buswell v. Supreme Sitting, 161 Mass.
224, 36 N. E. 1065 (1894); People v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 161
N. Y. 492, 55 N. E. 1053 (1900); Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd, 228
U. S. 482, 23 Sup. Ct. 554 (1913) (reorganization). See Swaine, Rcorganisa-
tion of Corporations (1927) 27 CoL. L. RBu. 901; Bonbright and Bergerman,
Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporatc
Reorganization (1928) 28 CoL. L. Ruv. 127.
9 GILBERT'S COLLMR ON BANKRUrTCY (2d ed. 1931) 5.
10 The contention that local creditors have a superior equity in local assets
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is a tendency to limit the discretion of the court to a specification
of the terms on which local assets may be transferred. Thus the
ancillary court while releasing the assets has sometimes directed
that resident creditors should be permitted to establish their
claims in the local courts.1 The argument is that such claimants,
having been deprived by the receivership of a right to attach local
assets, should be permitted to benefit by the ancillary proceedings
to the extent of establishing locally their status as creditors.12 And
to meet the contention that just and orderly distribution is pro-
moted by referring claims and assets alike to the primary juris-
diction, the court has usually pointed to some justifying circum-
stance, as, for example, the fact that most of the creditors reside
in the ancillary jurisdiction,'2 the fact that the claims are too
small to bear the expense of reference to a very distant tribunal,'"
steps already taken by creditors to prove their claims locally,15
or some ground for belief that their claims might not be fairly
and promptly considered in the primary jurisdiction.', In federal
receiverships, however, the advantages of central administration
and the convenience of creditors have both been served by a prac-
tice of sending out a master from the court of primary jurisdic-
tion to hear local claims.'
is distinctly repudiated. Parsons v. Charter Oak Life Insurance Co., 31
Fed. 305 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1887); Fry v. Charter Oak Life Insurance Co.,
31 Fed. 197 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1887); Sands v. Greeley, Superior Cabinet
Co. v. American Piano Co., both supra note 5; Buswell v. Supreme Sitting,
supra note 8; Brunner v. York Bridge Co., 78 W. Va. 702, 90 S. E. 233
(1916). It has been pointed out that when the assets of the insolvent are
in readily convertible form, if the rule were to be accepted that creditors
in each state have a superior equity in property within the state, the
officers of a corporation, foreseeing insolvency, could concentrate their
investments in certain states and thus defeat the rights of creditors else-
-where to participate in the distribution. Parsons v. Charter Oak Life Insur-
ance Co., supra, at 307.
". Sands v. Greeley, supra note 5; Pfahler v. McCrum, 197 Fed. 684 (E.
D. Wis. 1912) ; Buswell v. Supreme Sitting, supra note 8; Clark v. Painted
Post, supra note 4; Drury v. Doherty, 131 Mlisc. 642, 227 N. Y. Supp. 593
(Sup. Ct. 1928).
S12See Pfahler v. McCrum, supra note 11, at 685. But ef. Superior Cabinet
Co. v. American Piano Co., supra note 5 (privilege of local proof denied).
'3 Drury v. Doherty, supra note 11 (841 of creditors in New York).
'14Matter of People (Norske Lloyd Insurance Co.), supra note 4.
'5 Clark v. Painted Post, supra note 4 (claims already filed with ancillary
receiver).
l Pfahler v. McCrum, supra note 11 (primary receivership granted not
necessarily to wind up but merely to conserve assets) ; Drury v. Doherty,
supra note 11 (prejudicial receivership). Also when the insolvent has con-
verted property, and the claimant is able to trace the proceeds and asserts
beneficial ownership therein, he will not be required to seek relief in the
primary jurisdiction. Smith v. Lynch, 288 Fed. 552 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923).
17See Hearing before Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Repre-
sentatives on Equity Receiverships (H. R. 10,000), April 11, 1930, at 36.
1932]
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Apprehension that local creditors may not be equitably treated
in the foreign court has led to experiment with various protec-
tive devices in administration. In the early case of Buswell V.
Supreme Sitting,"' for example, the Massachusetts court ordered
a transfer of the reserve funds of local branches of an insolvent
mutual benefit association, conditional, however, upon its appear-
ing from the decree of the primary court that ample time would
be allowed for the proof of claims of local claimants and that the
entire fund would be distributed equally among all the members.
The later New York case of People v. Granite State Provident
Association ,9 concerned the transfer by an ancillary receiver ap-
pointed in New York, of funds of a New Hampshire corporation
which had made a general assignment of its assets pursuant to
the terms of an insolvency and winding-up statute. Part of the
fund, consisting of a deposit made by the corporation as a condi-
tion of doing business in New York was ordered distributed to
domestic creditors in accordance with the New York statute; the
other part consisting of general funds was to be transferred on
condition that a bond be given by the primary receiver that no
deductions would be made from the dividend of New York credi-
tors by reason of any sum they might have received from the
special deposit security. A dissenting opinion objected to the re-
quirement of a bond as a violation of the comity due to the court
of a sister state and as a precedent of "decidedly mischievous
tendencies." 20 In any event the conditions attached proved fatal
to unification of administration. The New Hampshire court re-
fused 21 to accept the stipulation that New York creditors should
be paid without deduction on account of the payments in New
York, pointing out that orders of an ancillary court are binding
only on property within its jurisdiction.22 The withholding of the
funds in New York represented only one of the difficulties con-
fronted by the domiciliary court in winding up a business whose
assets were in the hands of sixteen dncillary receivers subject to
the orders of the courts of as many states. In such a case the ad-
vantages to the unsecured creditors in general of a speedy and
18 Supra note 8.
19 Supra note 8.
20 Bond was required also in Clark v. Painted Post, supra note 4, and
Drury v. Doherty, supra note 11.
21 Bank Commissioners v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 70 N. 11. 557,
49 Atl. 124 (1901).
22 See Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, 272, 11 Sup. Ct. 773, 778 (1890).
The statement in the opinion that creditors and stockholders impliedly
agreed that in case of insolvency the final settlement would be governed by
the statutes and rules of the state giving the association its charter finds
support in other cases. Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222 (1880) ; Parsons v.
Charter Oak Life Insurance Co. and Fry v. Charter Oak Life Insurance
Co., both supra note 10.
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complete concentration of all unencumbered assets in the hands
of the primary receiver are obvious.
In Matter of People (Norske Lloyd In m'irane Co.),23 which
involved the application of the receiver of a corporation in a for-
eign country, the New York Court of Appeals held that equality
of distribution among creditors of the same class required the
transmission of funds not subject to lien or particular claim to
the court of primary jurisdiction.24 The only condition at-
tached, and that on account of the great distance and the small
amount of the claims, was that proof thereof should be permitted
in New York. The emphasis placed by this opinion on the domi-
nant r~le of the primary court for purposes of general adminis-
tration was soon reflected in a decision by the State Supreme
Court. The circumstances of a peculiarly difficult situation had
previously led that tribunal to assert that comity did not require
any transfer of assets by the ancillary receiver which it had
appointed. Practically all of the creditors and stockholders of the
Delaware corporation involved in that case resided in New York,
and the Delaware receiver had been appointed under circum-
stances which gave rise to apprehension that administration of
the estate would be biased in favor of Delaware claimants. Two
years later, however, following the Norske case, the transfer was
authorized 2 in accordance with an agreement which contained
conditions designed to protect New York creditors. - The opinion
pointed out that the Delaware court would have to pass upon
all claims presented to it by its receiver and that since its judg-
ments would be entitled to full faith and credit they would have
to be recognized in any distribution of assets in New York were
the assets retained.
Cozclz -uion
There are in general two practical objections to comprehensive
centralized administration of the property of insolvents: the
physical difficulties of reference to a distant forum and fear that
23 Supra note 4.
,- On the problem of whether the state in which a receiver is first named
or the state of incorporation must be recognized as the court of principal
administration, see Wickersham, op cit. supra note 4.
23 Drury v. Doherty, 127 Misc. 263, 215 N. Y. Supp. 613 (Sup. Ct. 1926)
(original case).
26 Drury v. Doherty, supra note 11.
27 The conditions of transfer included: notices to New York creditors;
opportunity to prove claims in New York; primary receiver to furnish bond
of a surety company amenable to process in New York, guaranteeing do-
mestic creditors a full or pro-rata payment; privilege accorded ancillary
receiver to intervene in proceedings in Delaware or elsewhere in connec-
tion with proof of claims by other creditors; time limit for termination of
liquidating proceedings in Delaware.
19321
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the foreign court will discriminate against local claimants. The
objections are the same regardless of the type of the assignment
or receivership through which administration is attempted, and
they arise also in the administration of insolvent decedents' es-
tates. 28 The extent to which courts have recognized the claims
of foreign assignees, receivers or trustees has, however, been
affected by varying legal doctrines as well as by statute. The
most illiberal attitude has been that with respect to foreign
"involuntary" assignments. From its difficulties the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act with its concentration of authority in the trustee rep-
resents an escape. In the field of equity receiverships the result
of experimentation in working out the relationship between courts
of ancillary and primary jurisdiction is an increased emphasis on
the subordinate character of the ancillary proceedings and a
tendency to facilitate the transfer of claims and assets to the
primary receiver. The conditions sometimes attached to assure
the fair treatment of domestic creditors, while perhaps helpful
in individual cases,-are not impressive when contrasted with
the advantages of uniform single-cost administration. For
greater efficiency of administration in federal receiverships it has
been proposed 29 to amend Section 56 of the Judicial Code -" so as
23 When the estate is shown to be insolvent, a creditor proceeding in the
state of ancillary administration is entitled only to his pro-rata share of
the entire assets. Dawes v. Head, 3 Pick. 128 (Mass. 1825) ; Davis v. Estoy,
8 Pick. 476 (Mass. 1829); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 196 Ill. 179, 63 N. E. 618
(1902) ; In re Hanreddy's Estate, 176 Wis. 570, 186 N. W. 744 (1922) ; see
Mitchell v. Cox, 28 Ga. 32, 34 (1859). But it might be too complicated and
slow to work out pro-rata distribution. See Miner v. Austin, 45 Iowa 221,
227 (1876) (petition of domiciliary administrator that ancillary adminis-
trator should remit a sufficient share of the assets to permit pro-rata pay-
ment to all creditors refused as not within jurisdiction of probate court).
Quaere, as to result in equity court. Lewis v. Rutherford, 71 Ark. 218, '72
S. W. 373 (1903). Non-resident creditors may prove claims in the ancillary
administration. Miner v. Austin, In re Hanreddy's Estate, supra. Contra:
Hunt v. Fay, 7 Vt. 170' (1835). But if their claims will make the ancillary
estate insolvent, quaere, whether they should not be postponed until they
have exhausted all remedy against his principal estate. Miner v. Austin,
supra. The transfer of assets to the domiciliary administrator being within
the discretion of the court, it has been held to be no abuse of discretion to
order the transfer even when there are no domiciliary creditors and all
heirs ask distribution in the ancillary jurisdiction. In ro Lane's Estate,
199 Iowa 520, 202 N. W. 244 (1925) (solvent estate). In New York distri-
bution of estates under ancillary administration will be made only for
convenience and to avoid unnecessary expense and delay. In re Worch's
Estate, 124 Misc. 380, a08 N. Y. Supp. 652 (Surrogate's Court, Now York
County 1925). When practically all of the estate is in Now York, remission
will not be ordered unless the rights of creditors or beneficiaries will be
served. In re Bliss' Estate, 121 Misc. 773, 202 N. Y. Supp. 185 (Surrogate's
Court, New York County 1923).
29 Hearing on Equity Receiverships, supra note 17.
30 36 STAT. 1102 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 117( 1926).
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to give the primary receiver full control over the property of the
insolvent business, wherever situated. Such a proposal is obvi-
ously particularly needful in the case of large operating receiver-
ships, and especially so when they look to reorganization.2 Such
a change in federal practice would undoubtedly stimulate the tend-
ency, apparent also in the state courts, to free the primary ad-
ministration from obstructions which have their basis in vain
fears that local creditors will be unfairly dealt with in the foreign
tribunal.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GASOLINE TAXES IN THE
LIGHT OF THEIR CURRENT OPERATION
THE legend of "finding the highways paved with gold" seems to
have been politically rediscovered in the United States with the
passage of the first gasoline tax by Oregon in 1919. Theoreti-
cally it appeared to be the perfect tax. To the motorist it promised
improved highways and the possibilities of lower operating costs.
The distributor had reason to believe that appropriation of the
tax proceeds to the development of better roads and the resultant
increase in gasoline sales would more than offset the burden of
collecting the tax. And for the state governments, it provided
a new revenue fund with none of the attendant evils of unwieldly
collection costs.' It is no wonder, then, that the tax within ten
years spread to every state in the union and was increased from
an innocuous levy of one cent per gallon to new levels which in
some instances advanced the cost of the gasoline by 100'2
Yet, in spite of its apparent popularity, the tax has proved to
be the source of much litigation. On several occasions the Su-
preme Court has been called upon to uphold the general validity
of the measure and to pass upon the extent of its permissible
application. In one instance it reaffirmed the settled principle
that since the uniformity requirement of the state constitutions
applies only to property taxation, the state has the power to
select a particular commodity as the object of a tax upon sale
3' The ancillary receivership has ben condemned as producing "great in-
convenience, substantial additional expense, and at times serious disruption
in the operation of the properties." Annual Report (1927) of Special Com-
mittee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. See Hear-
ing, supra note 17, at 32.
'See CRAWFORD, ADmINISTRATION op GAsoLINE TAx IN THE U. S. (1930)
c. 4, table IV.
2 Today only five states have two cent taxes, eleven have three cents, at
least five have six cents, two have seven cents and the rest charge four
cents. New York and a few of the other low tax states are considering
drastic revision upwards. See Flynn, Bootleg Gazollh (reprinted from
Collier's Weekly by American Petroleum Institute) (1931) 2; OIL AND GAS
JoURNAL, June 26, 1930, at 148; CRAwFORD, op. cit. szpra note 1, at 34.
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and use.3 Later it held that the state in the exercise of its power
to regulate the sale of gasoline was neither unreasonable nor
depriving the gasoline companies of property without due process
by requiring them to collect the amount of the tax from the ulti-
mate consumer without compensation for their services.4 And
though a state might be restrained by the commerce clause from
taxing the sale of petroleum products to a purchaser outside of
its borders,5 yet according to the decision in Sonneborn Bros. 'V.
Keeling,6 a tax on the intrastate sale of gasoline, previously
shipped into the state and coming to rest therein, would not be
a burden on interstate commerce whether the subsequent sale be
in original or broken packages. In Panlndle Oil Co. v. Mississ-
ippi ,7 however, the Court found no basis for the tax where the
character of the purchaser, for example, a federal agency,
creates a valid exemption.
The most troublesome constitutional problem was presented
when an attempt was made to collect a tax on the sale of gasoline
to be used in interstate commerce. Helsn v. Kentucky 8 denied
the power of the state to impose a tax on the use of gasoline pur-
chased outside the state for use as fuel in interstate carriage,
notwithstanding that the tax was confined to gasoline actually
consumed within the state limits. But where the sale has oc-
curred within the taxing state, there is a pronounced conflict.
In one recent case 11 the court flatly denied the contention that it
3 Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642, 41 Sup. Ct. 606 (1921);
Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U. S. 466, 42 Sup. Ct. 375 (1922).
4 Pierce Oil Co. v. Hopkins, 264 U. S. 137, 44 Sup. Ct. 251 (1924). Two
states, Illinois and Pennsylvania, allow the distributors a certain percent-
age of the tax proceeds for expense involved in collecting the tax. See
CRAWFORD, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 16.
5 But cf. Ouachita Valley Refining Co. v. Conway, 51 Y. (2d) 854 (W.
D. La. 1931), where the court "looked through" a fictitious interstato sale
contracted to avoid payment of the tax, and allowed the state officers to
seize the goods so shipped.
O 262 U. S. 506, 43 Sup. Ct. 643 (1923). See Notes (1923) 37 HAI. L.
REv. 157;' (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 321; (1924) 2 Tnx. L. Rnv. 250. Of. Hart
Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U. S. 499, 49 Sup. Ct. 188 (1929), where it was
held that although a state is permitted to tax the use of, as well as the
sale of, gas coming into a state after an interstate sale, statutory exemp-
tion of such a sale or use was not unduly discriminatory or contrary to
the equal protection clause.
7 277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451 (1928) (four judges dissenting).
8 279 U. S. 245, 49 Sup. Ct. 279 (1929).
9 Eastern Air Transport v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 62 F. (2d)
456 (E. D. S. C. 1931). Contra: U. S. Airways v. Shaw, 43 F. (2d) 148
(W. D. Okla. 1930); Mid-Continent Air Express Corp. v. Lujan, 47 F.
(2d). 266 (D. N. M. 1931). Cf., for successful attempts of the state to
tax other commodities destined for interstate commerce though not for
interstate use, Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup. Ct.
83 (1922) (coal); Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 43 Sup. Ct. 526
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was a tax on an instrumentality of interstate commerce and
based its decision on the state's right to tax the sale, within its
borders, of any commodity, regardless of its intended use. The
same result was reached in another case 21 by invoking the state's
right to require motor-vehicle proprietors, though engaged ex-
clusively in interstate commerce, to contribute to the construc-
tion cost and upkeep of the public roads.
The broad background of constitutional sanction for the tax
thus appears established. But in the transition from a low to a
high tax era, two tendencies have come to assume greater im-
poitance directly in proportion to the increasing tax. First,
because of the high premium for disobedience, there is a serious
evasion of the tax, on the one hand by farmers who are exempt
only in respect to non-highway uses, and on the other, by racke-
teers who have placed tax-dodging on a profitable basis. Secondly,
there is the growing temptation for state legislatures, in the face
of so lucrative a source of income, to frustrate the purpose of
the tax by diverting the proceeds to other than highway uses.
It is quite possible that the factual situations thus following in
the wake of high taxes may throw a different light on the ac-
cepted legality of such statutes.
If the attribute of uniformity is required only of taxes on
property and not of excise taxes 1' it is axiomatic, neverthe-
less, that in classifying members of a selected group for pur-
poses of excise taxes the same considerations apply as in the
case of a classification for the taxation of property.'- Conse-
quently, if a commodity like gasoline be singled out to bear an
excise tax on its sale or use, it must be conceded that there can
be no unjust or invidious discrimination in the adminstration of
such a tax.1 3 The exemption from the payment of the tax ordi-
(1923) (iron ore); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284, 47 Sup.
Ct. 639 (1927) (gas).
10 Boeing Air Transport v. Edelman, 51 F. (2d) 130 (D. Wyo. 1931).
See also Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35. Sup. Ct. 140 (1915);
Kane v. State of New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30 (191G); Clark
v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct. 702 (1927); Sprout v. City of South
Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 48 Sup. Ct. 502 (1928). But cf. Interstate Transit,
Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183, 51 Sup. Ct. 380 (1931), where the statute
made no provision for the use of the proceeds towards the construction
and maintenance of state highways.
-1 Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., supra note 3; 1 CooLY, TAXATION (4th
ed. 1924) § 269.
124 CooL=, op. cit. supra note 11, § 1685, n. 4; Mutual Loan Co. v.
Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 32 Sup. Ct. 74 (1911); see Swayze, Judicial Cwt-
structio of the Fourteenth A-mendnint (1912) 26 HAnV. L. REV. 1, 32.
"S BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1897) 391; Note (1929) 77 U. of
PA. L. Rnv. 426; see Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U. S. 499, 49 Sup. Ct. 188
(1929); Foster & Creighton Co. v. Graham, 154 Tenn. 412, 285 S. W. 570
(1926) ; Breece Lumber Co. v. Mirabal, 34 N. M. 643, 287 Pac. 099 (1930);
Gafill v. Bracken, 195 Ind. 551, 145 N. E. 312 (1924).
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narily allowed to farmers, motor boat proprietors, dry-cleaning
establishments, etc., as distinguished from the rest of the gas
consuming public, is justifiable only on the theory that the tax
was imposed for a particular benefit conferred, the use of the
highways, and that it is fitting for the recipients of that benefit
to bear the burden of initial construction and maintenance.1 4
Theoretically the farmer is under the same liability as others for
the payment of the tax on gasoline consumed on the highway.
But, in the "high-tax states," he has easily extended his immunity
from the payment of the tax for agricultural purposes to transpor-
tation uses as well. Thus in Kansas, it is revealed that, while the
gross collections of the tax for 1931 during the farm months ex-
ceeded those of the same period in 1930 by only 11%, the refunds
for 1931 during that interval showed an increase of 137% over the
previous year.'5 Moreover, in the same state, on the basis of re-
funds, since practically all were claimed on account of agricultural
use, the farm tractors should have performed 65% more work than
they did in 1930; but actually, as a result of the moisture conditions
from July to October of 1931, they were prevented from doing
as much. In Oklahoma, the reported gallonage for exemption
in 1931, during the months of April, May, June and July, showed
an increase of 49.66% over the same period in 1930.10 And
though there was an increase of 2.22% in the sale of gasoline
during the first quarter of 1931, there was also an increase of
94.2% in the exemption for that period as compared with 1930.17
This anomalous situation is not indigenous to Kansas and Okla-
homa but arises wherever the factors of farmers' exemptions
and an unduly high tax appear.' s
On the other hand, the reasonableness of a tax on highway,
'1 Swayze, op. cit. supra note 12, at 40; Note (1931) 31 CoL. L. REV. 145,
151, n. 51.
15 And though the percentage of refunds for 1929 and 1930 was 16.5%
and 15.8%, respectively, in 1931, for the first nine months it was 40.8% of
the total collection. The following tabulation of collections and refunds
over a period of four years is cited in the Wichita Chamber of Commerce,
Report on Gasoline Tax. Evasion in Kansas, Nov., 1931:
May-September (inclusive) Annual
Collections Refunds Collections Refunds
1928 $2,815,492 $281,943 $5,910,674 $592,018
1929 5,204,733 743,890 9,456,488 1,562,170
1930 5,271,584 814,864 10,828,964 1,711,215
1931 5,886,805 1,929,018 6,845,055 2,797,395
'L OKLAHOmA Naws, Sept. 29, 1931 (submitted by Mid-Continental 0i
and Gas Ass'n).
-7Bulletin, Mid-Continental Oil and Gas Ads'n (May, 1931) 1. The fig-
ures for certain months are even more surprising. Jan. 1931 showed an
increase in tax-exempt gas of 370.19% over the previous January.
" For widespread discontent with the abuses of a high tax on gasoline
see What The Editors are Saying About Gasoline Taxes, American Petro-
leum Institute; also BUSINESS WEEK, July 2, 1930, at 12.
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as distinguished from non-highway, use exists only when the
proceeds are applied solely to the betterment of roads. But at
least thirteen states have statutory provisions for the expendi-
ture of the tax proceeds for purposes unrelated to the highways.0
And, even in those states where no such provision exists, a cer-
tain portion of the fund is generally distributed to counties and
cities which are presumably required to devote it to the better-
ment of roads but which invariably use it for salaries of city
employees, local advertising and a variety of other purposes.- '
It seems, therefore, that the flagrant abuse of exemptions by
farmers' use of tax-free gas on the highways and the diversion
of tax proceeds for non-highway purposes destroy the substan-
tial basis for the disparity of legal treatment and its relation
to the purpose of the statute.2 1
Furthermore, the rights of the gasoline distributors are
gravely impaired where the tax rate is raised beyond the level
at which adherence to the intent and letter of the law can be
expected.? The devices are legion by which the unscrupulous
gasoline distributor can successfully and consistently dodge the
payment of the tax.? With the tax-evader having the amount
29 For example, tax proceeds are diverted for fish hatcheries, school
funds, unemployment relief, seed distribution, flood relief, building of sea
walls, etc. See CRAWFoRD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 21 et seq.; also LITEiRY
DIGEsT, June 15, 1929, at 64; Trumbower, The Gasolinw Tax, Rsv. oF REV.,
July, 1925, at 83. Cf. Learned, State Gasoline Studies, BULLETIN OF U. OP
KANSAS HumAmsTIc STUDIES, Vol. III, No. 4 (1925) 55 ct seq. It should
be noted that in some states there are no provisions for refunds or ex-
emptions and the same arguments against diverting the proceeds do not
apply. However, when the tax is a high one, the evils of racketeering men-
tioned infra still are pertinent.
20 See CRAWFOoD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 28; Hadlick, Letter to the
Editor, Bus. WK. Aug. 12, 1931, p. 31; AmERICAN CITY, March, 1929, at 11G.
21 See Note (1931) 7 INDv. L. J. 179, 183 n. 18 for authorities cited. See
also Note (1931) 40 YA.E L. J. 431. There are no conclusive authorities on
the point made. However, interesting analogies can be found in Yic: Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064 (1886), where certain laundry
regulations were enforced only against Chinese; and in Iowa-Des Moines
Nat. Bk. v. Bennett, 52 Sup. Ct. 133 (1931), where state officers applied
the provisions of a state tax on bank shares only against national bans.
22 "But the grant of authority to impose fees for the purposes of revenue
does not warrant their being made so heavy as to be prohibitory, thereby
defeating the purpose, where the business or occupation is a useful and
lawful one.... So far as the right to engage in a business of a harmless
and useful character is concerned, the state may not impose an occupation
tax which shall operate as a prohibition or as a burden of magnitude suffi-
cient to render the right valueless." 4 CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 11, § 1714
and notes.
23 Thus evasion may be effected by mixing tax-free kerosene with gaso-
line and selling the entire liquid as motor-fuel at a lower price than the
same quantity of unadulterated tax-burdened gas. (see suggestions as to
statutory definition of motor fuel in Report of The Caominssio. on Uni-
fqrm State Gasoline Law, ALIn. PET. INST., Nov. 12, 1931; McAFFx, LEG-
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of the pocketed tax as a margin by which he can undersell his
honest competitor, the latter must assume the tax-burden out of
his profit. Consequently, the dealers' contention that the tax
violates the "due process clause" is not sufficiently rebutted by
the argument that indirect taxes are made an item in the final
price and the burden passed on to the ultimate consumer who
receives the benefit in the form of better roads.24 It is suggested,
here, thait the law may be said to be administered with "an evil
eye" when it results in the suppression of the legitimate and the
building up of the illegitimate3 Furthermore, though the de-
mand for gasoline is said to be inelastic," there is, nevertheless,
a price at which a good portion of the gas-consuming public will
have to restrict their use, and such a tax will necessarily cut
down the demand for the product.
Where the gas industries' profits are diminished, first, by a
decrease in the sale of the commodity, either because of a prohib-
itive rate serving no proper regulatory function, or because of the
cutthroat competition of racketeers who pay no tax, and, secondly,
by the unreasonable expense involved in the collection of a high tax
rate without compensation therefore, the court might very well
find that the distinctions of law were no longer warranted, that the
law was unreasonable and that property was being taken without
due process.
2 8
ISLATIVE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST GASOLINE TAX EVASION (1931) 5]; by pay-
ing protection to racketeers who "fix" the official collectors; by purchas-
ing'gas from tank trucks operating at night so as to dodge tax inspectors;
with the proceeds before collection. See What the Editors Are Saying,
supra note 18; FLYNN, op. cit. supra, note 2; OIL AND GAS JOURNAL Oct.
29, 1931, at 18; Conine, Menace of Gas Tax Evasion Spreads, OIL AND
GAS J., April 9, 1931, at 29; OIL AND GAS J., Jan. 15, 1931, at 64.
24 Learned, op. cit. supra note 19, at 73, 78 et seq.
25 See OjL AND GAS J., April 23, 1931, at 53.
26 CRAWFORD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 35. But cf. Learned, op. cit. supra
note 19, at 75 and 82, where a high tax, which will cut down the demand, Is
advocated as a means of conserving our limited oil supply. See, too, Iso in
(1925) 14 AMERICAN XCON. REv. 289-290.
27 This point may have been reached in Oklahoma, where there was a
4.93% decrease from the previous year in the amount of gas consumed for
the first eight months of 1931 under the higher tax, as compared with an
increase of 5.38% in the six bordering states and an increase of 2.27% for
the entire nation. Report to Executive Com., Kansas-Oklahoma Division,
Mid-Cont. Oil & Gas Ass'n, Oct. 1, 1931. The effect on the tax proceeds may
indicate that perhaps Oklahoma has reached the point of diminishing returns,
for in spite of a 25% increase in the tax rate for 1931, the total amount of
taxes collected in the 1931 period was 7.35% less than the previous year; and
considering the fact that the additional one cent revenue was to go to pur-
poses other than highway construction and maintenance, the amount that
eventually reaches the highway fund will be 25.88% less than the previous
year.
28 See Wham, The Gasoline Tax (1927) 21 ILL. L. RaV. 771, 777.
